The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition"
: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success
Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place: 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University
Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure. The 2007 article "," published in the Journal
Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success
: Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can use the rents (extra resources) created by economic restrictions to buy off their core supporters, often making them more secure rather than less. Onset and Initiation Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University
Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists.